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ABSTRACT
In order to improve mobile data transparency, a number of
network-based approaches have been proposed to inspect
packets generated by mobile devices and detect personally
identifiable information (PII), ad requests, or other activi-
ties. State-of-the-art approaches train classifiers based on
features extracted from HTTP packets. So far, these clas-
sifiers have only been trained in a centralized way, where
mobile users label and upload their packet logs to a cen-
tral server, which then trains a global classifier and shares
it with the users to apply on their devices. However, packet
logs used as training data may contain sensitive information
that users may not want to share/upload. In this paper, we
apply, for the first time, a Federated Learning approach to
mobile packet classification, which allows mobile devices to
collaborate and train a global model, without sharing raw
training data. Methodological challenges we address in this
context include: model and feature selection, and tuning the
Federated Learning parameters. We apply our framework to
two different packet classification tasks (i.e., to predict PII
exposure or ad requests in HTTP packets) and we demon-
strate its effectiveness in terms of classification performance,
communication and computation cost, using three real-world
datasets.
1. INTRODUCTION
There is recently increased public awareness and concern
about how sensitive information available on mobile devices
is shared and tracked. In particular, mobile apps and third
party libraries (including developer, tracking and advertising
libraries) routinely send such information (i.e., personally
identifiable information or “PII”, sensory data, user activity)
to remote servers, typically without the user being aware or
in control of this information flow. Some steps are being
taken to increase mobile, and more generally online, data
transparency on the legal side (EU GDPR [1], CCPA [2],
COPPA [3]) as well as on the technical side, including ap-
proaches like permissions [4, 5, 6, 7], static and dynamic
approaches [8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15], and network-based
approaches [16, 17, 18].
In this paper, we focus on network-based approaches that
inspect packets transmitted out of mobile devices in order
to detect PII, tracking, ad requests, malware or other activ-
ities; an example is depicted on Fig. 2. This information
can then be used to take action (e.g., block outgoing pack-
ets), to inform the user or for measurement studies. Early
approaches (such as Haystack/Lumen [19, 20] and AntMon-
itor [21, 22, 23]) performed deep packet inspection (DPI)
and string matching to find PII. Mobile browsers [24] use
manually-curated filter-lists (such as EasyList [25], hpHosts
[26], and AdAway [27]) to match URI and other information
and block ad requests.
Machine learning approaches have been recently proposed
to predict PII (e.g., Recon [16] and AntShield [28, 17]) or ad
requests (NoMoAds [18]) in outgoing packets, based on fea-
tures extracted from HTTP requests. These classifiers are
trained using labeled packet traces, obtained either through
manual/automatic testing of apps, or by devices labeling pack-
ets from real user activity to contribute them to a server.
However, training has only been done in a Centralized way
so far.
Consider the scenario and options presented on Fig. 1.
In the Local approach (Fig. 1(a)), mobile users could label
packets on their device, train and apply their own classifier
locally. In this case, users do not share any information with
untrusted servers or other users, thus preserving their pri-
vacy. However, they do not benefit from the global training
data that is available on a large number of devices either.
In the Centralized approach (Fig. 1(b)), mobile users label
and upload their packet logs to a central server, which then
trains a global classifier and shares it with all users to ap-
ply on their devices. However, packet traces labeled with
PII, tracking and advertising, contain sensitive information
that users may not want to share with a server or other users.
In this paper, we propose Federated Mobile Packet Classi-
fication, which combines the best of both worlds: it allows
mobile devices to collectively train a global model, without
sharing their raw training data that may contain sensitive in-
formation (in the label, features, or any part of the HTTP
packet).
The Federated Learning framework was proposed in [29,
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(a) Local: share nothing (b) Centralized: devices share training data (c) Federated: Devices share model parameters, not data
Figure 1: Overview of general approaches to train machine learning models for packets from mobile devices.
Figure 2: Example of an outgoing HTTP packet, sent from
an app on the mobile device to a remote server. The URI
field alone reveals a lot of information, including various
identifiers, referred domain, location and other parameters
that can be used for fingerprinting and tracking users.
30], to collaboratively train models for mobile devices with-
out sharing raw training data. An overview is depicted on
Fig. 1(c). The main idea is that mobile devices train a lo-
cal model, and send only model parameters to the server,
instead of the raw training data; the server aggregates the in-
formation from all users, and sends the updated parameters
of the global model to all devices, and the process repeats un-
til convergence. In this paper, we apply Federated Learning
to classify outgoing HTTP packets w.r.t. two specific tasks,
namely predicting whether an outgoing packet contains (1) a
PII (which we refer to as PII exposure) or (2) an Ad request
(which typically results in an ad being served in the HTTP
response). Methodological challenges we had to address in
order to apply Federated Learning to packet classification in-
clude: model and feature selection, and tuning the Federated
Learning parameters. We also evaluated our methodology
using three real-world datasets and showed that it achieves
high classification F1 score for both classification tasks (PII
exposure and Ad Request), with minimal computation and
communication cost. This paper makes the following three
contributions.
1. Feature Space for HTTP packets. We propose a feature
space based on HTTP features that performs well for both
classification tasks (since PII exposure and Ad requests use
the same fields to profile users), while protecting sensitive
information and reducing the feature space. First, we ob-
serve that not only training data, but also features can expose
sensitive information; e.g., that would be the case if some of
the PII shown on Fig. 2 were selected as features. Therefore,
we use only HTTP Keys as features from an HTTP packet, (i)
keys from URI and Cookie fields (ii) custom HTTP headers
and (iii) the presence of a file request. We purposely do not
use neither destination domains or hostnames, nor any infor-
mation from the URI path (which could be sensitive itself
if a user visits a sensitive website with i.e., political, medi-
cal or religious content) but only the keys mentioned above.
Prior work such as Recon [16] and NoMoAds [18] used all
the words from the HTTP packets after discarding the most
frequent ones and the rarest ones. Our choice of features
not only minimizes the sharing of sensitive information, but
also reduces the number of parameters that need to be up-
dated. Second, we observe that the size of the feature space
depends on the mobile apps and third-party libraries. For ex-
ample, Webview apps can access any domain, which leads to
an explosion of feature space size and wide variation across
users; in contrast, non-Webview apps have a limited API and
result in a small feature space, which is the same across dif-
ferent users.
2. Model Selection: Federated SVM. State-of-the-art clas-
sifiers for mobile packet classification have typically trained
Decision Trees (DT) to predict PII exposure (Recon [16])
or Ad requests (NoMoAds [18]) based on features extracted
from HTTP packets. DT were chosen by prior work primar-
ily for two reasons: (i) their good classification performance
and (ii) their interpretability (nodes in the trees are intuitive
rules). Unfortunately, DT do not naturally lend themselves
to federation, which has been developed for models based
on Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD), primarily for Deep
Neural Networks (DNNs) [29, 30]. In this paper, we propose
Federated SVM as the core of the federated packet classifi-
cation framework. We show that (i) Support Vector Machine
(SVM) performs similarly to DT for our problem, (ii) Fed-
erated SVM achieves similar F1 score to Centralized SVM,
within few communication rounds and with low computa-
tion cost per user, and (iii) SVM can be as interpretable as
DT and we also discuss knowledge transfer between the two.
3. Evaluation using three real-world datasets and two
classification tasks. To evaluate our framework, we used
different datasets: the publicly available NoMoAds for Ad
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requests [18, 31] and AntShield for PII exposures [28, 32];
and our in-house datasets with real users. For the first two
datasets, we create synthetic users by splitting the data evenly
or unevenly, and we evaluate how it affects Federated Learn-
ing. We compare Federated to Centralized and Local approa-
ches w.r.t. to the classification performance, communication
rounds and computation. We show that the Federated mod-
els are superior to Local models and comparable to their cor-
responding Centralized models, without requiring too many
communication rounds or too much computation per client
in order to achieve an F1 score above 0.90 for PII and above
0.84 for Ad request prediction. We also demonstrate the ben-
efit of crowdsourcing: a relatively small number of users is
sufficient to train a good Federated model that generalizes
well to most users.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
reviews related work. Section 3 presents our methodology
for federated packet classification. Section 4 describes the
datasets used for evaluation. Section 5 presents results for
various scenarios and provides insights along the way. Sec-
tion 6 concludes the paper and discusses directions for future
work.
2. RELATED WORK
Performance measurements from mobile devices have cap-
tured the interest of many researchers over the years [33, 34,
35, 36, 37, 38, 39]. There is also increasing interest in un-
derstanding and controlling PII exposure and user tracking
on mobile devices. Some proposed approaches include: per-
missions [4, 5, 6, 7], static analysis [8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13],
dynamic analysis [14, 15], and network-based approaches
[40, 41, 42]; our work falls within the latter.
Interception of Mobile Traffic. Network-based approa-
ches inspect mobile traffic for PII exposure, or other infor-
mation of interest, such as tracking, malware, advertising.
State-of-the-art tools include Haystack/Lumen [19, 20, 43],
Antmonitor [44, 23, 22]. Lumen and Antmonitor use string
matching to detect PII in outgoing packets sent from various
apps to remote destinations. The interception of mobile traf-
fic is not part of our contribution but it is orthogonal to our
approach.
PII and Ad Detection via Blacklists. There are many
approaches based on manually curated blacklists [25, 26,
27] of domains on which they decide to block the whole
packet destined to such domains or cookies from such do-
mains [45]. Since blacklists are hard to maintain due to the
ever-changing advertising ecosystem, there are many efforts
to update such blacklists with additional graph analysis [46],
or with machine learning [47, 48, 49, 18].
Machine Learning-Based PII and Ad Detection. Recon
[16] and AntShield [17] are machine learning approaches to
detect PII exposure in outgoing HTTP packets: they train
(offline, and in a centralized fashion) per-app/domain De-
cision Trees to detect PII exposures, based on features ex-
tracted from HTTP packets. NoMoAds [18] is state-of-the-art
approach for detecting Ad requests by enhancing blacklists
via machine learning. We build on top of these ML approa-
ches to introduce mobile packet classification learning in a
distributed way. A step towards a more privacy-preserving
PII detection on mobile devices is PrivacyProxy [50], which
processes user data locally and sends only hashed data to a
server. One of its limitations is the cold start problem: it
has to wait for enough data to be collected from other users
in order to detect PII. MobiPurpose [51] uses the keys only
from network requests from apps, in addition to app meta-
data and domain information, to classify the reason of PII
exposure based on predefined candidates (i.e., advertising,
geo-tagging, etc.). All these approaches are Centralized, as
they do not consider collaboration between users to lever-
age diverse app usage behaviors that can generate PII or Ad
requests. We would like to note that our federated mobile
classification approach can be used towards predicting other
tasks, i.e., fingerprinting detection [52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 40]
assuming the availability of a corresponding per-packet la-
beled dataset. In this work, we focus on two classification
tasks: PII exposure and Ad request detection because of the
availability of labeled datasets that support these per-packet
classification tasks.
Distributed Learning. The authors in [28] showed that
systematic crowdsourcing where users collaborate with each
other via data sharing helped to train better classifiers to de-
tect PII exposures. However, it is assumed that users are
willing to share their raw local data with a server and other
users, which poses privacy risks. In order to leverage crowd-
sourcing in a more privacy-preserving way, we considered
two approaches to enable collaborative training of a global
model from several mobile devices: Federated Learning (which
is our focus in this paper) and Private Aggregation with Teacher
Ensembles (PATE) [57]. PATE trains a public Student model
on labeled public data via a Teacher model trained on private
data. In our problem, devices could train the Teacher, and
public data could be datasets that have been made available
by the research community or online communities, includ-
ing those used in this paper [31, 32]. However, such pub-
lic datasets do not necessarily capture all diverse patterns
from apps, since they are produced via manual testing or au-
tomatic scripts that do not represent real users’ app usage.
Hence, we chose Federated Learning for our framework and
problem space.
Federated Learning. An early version was proposed in
[58], where users trained models locally and shared the Sto-
chastic Gradient Descent updates of certain parameters with
a server, which then updated the global model. However [58]
had no averaging mechanism and the evaluation was lim-
ited. The papers that coined the term “Federated Learning”
were introduced in [29, 30], in order to train text and image
classifiers using training data available on a large number of
mobile devices. The idea is that devices train SGD-based
classifiers based on their local data and send updates (model
parameters) to a trusted server, which aggregates them to up-
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date a global model. The main advantage of this approach
is that the raw training data does not leave the device and
thus, it is more privacy-preserving than a centralized model.
A secondary advantage is that exchanging model parameters
requires less communication (assuming fast convergence) than
exchanging the raw training data, but this communication
saving comes at some computational cost imposed on the de-
vices to train models locally. Subsequent papers introduced
optimizations in terms of communication efficiency, scala-
bility and convergence [59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66], or
optimization in client selection [67].
In contrast to related work in the field that is using image
classification or next word prediction via word and character
embeddings [29], we focus on a problem where pre-trained
word embeddings (such as Word2Vec [68]) are not appli-
cable due to non-dictionary words present in HTTP pack-
ets. We apply Federated Learning in a setting where shallow
models’ (such as SVMs) performance is comparable to state-
of-the-art methods, this means that specialized deep learn-
ing model architectures (such as Convolutional Neural Net-
works (CNNs) or Long Short-Term Memory (LSTMs) [29])
are unnecessary.
Privacy and Federated Learning. Several security and
privacy attacks are known for machine learning systems; e.g.,
[69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74] which include membership inference
attacks, model inversion/extraction in ML models, poison-
ing the Federated model via malicious clients [75, 76], ma-
licious server [77] or training a backdoor task in addition to
the main task in order to perform model replacement [78].
Although Federated Learning protects the raw training data
of each device and shares only model parameter updates,
these updates (or even the features of the model [79]) may
themselves leak information, due to privacy vulnerabilities
of stochastic gradient descent (SGD) [80]. To prevent pri-
vacy attacks, additional mechanisms have been proposed on
top of Federated Learning, most notably, Secure Aggrega-
tion based on secure Multi-Party Computation (MPC) [81]
or Differential Privacy [82] to offer privacy guarantees [83,
84, 85, 86] or both [87]. In this paper, we consider such vari-
ants of Federated Learning, as orthogonal and out of scope.
Our focus in this paper is on the basic Federated Learning
framework; how to adapt and evaluate it specifically for the
task of mobile packet classification (as opposed to the image
and text classification that is most commonly used for). The
aforementioned attack scenarios in case of federated packet
classification are deferred for future work.
3. METHODOLOGY
3.1 Problem Setup
Goal. We aim to train classifiers that use features ex-
tracted from HTTP requests coming out of mobile devices,
to predict whether those packets contain information of in-
terest, such as a PII exposure or Ad request.1 In order to train
1Being able to classify packets enables further action such as block-
such classifiers, we need training data, i.e., packet traces
and labels indicating whether a packet contains the infor-
mation of interest. We assume that training data are crowd-
sourced, i.e., obtained and labeled on mobile devices and
sent to a server that aggregates them and trains classifiers2.
We also assume that the devices do not trust the server or
other devices but they do want to contribute to the training
and use the resulting global classifier. Our goal is to provide
a methodology that enables devices to collaborate in training
global classifiers, while avoiding to upload raw training data
or even sensitive features to the server.
Federated Learning Approach. To achieve this goal, we
apply the Federated Learning framework (depicted on Fig.
1(c) and described in Section 2) for the first time to the prob-
lem of mobile packet classification. This requires addressing
several challenges and making design choices and optimiza-
tions, specific to our context, such as the following.
Q1. What packet features can best predict the labels of
interest (i.e., PII exposure or Ad request) in a packet? Sec-
tion 3.2 discusses how we select HTTP Keys features from
HTTP packets, to achieve high classification performance
while also meeting privacy and other constraints.
Q2. What model should we train with Federated Learn-
ing? Section 3.3 compares different alternatives and pro-
poses a Federated SVM framework.
Q3. What datasets should be used to train and test those
classifiers? Our training dataset consists of HTTP packets
sent by mobile devices, labeled appropriately for each pre-
diction task, i.e., with binary labels to indicate PII exposure
or Ad requests in each packet. Collection can be done using
one of the existing VPN-based tools for intercepting traffic
on the mobile device [19, 21], and labeling can be done using
DPI [16, 17, 28], blacklists [25] or other tools [18]. Section
4 describes three real-world datasets we used in this paper.
Scope. Our focus in this paper is on adapting and evalu-
ating the Federated Learning framework specifically for mo-
bile packet classification. An overview of our pipeline is
provided on Fig. 3, and the rest of the section describes the
details.
The following considerations are out of the scope of this
paper and deferred to future work. First, as discussed in Sec-
tion 2, there are known privacy attacks to Federated Learn-
ing, and proposed solutions (e.g., secure aggregation and dif-
ferential privacy) that can be added on the basic framework
and are not considered in this paper. Second, our classifiers
are trained on features extracted from HTTP or decrypted
HTTPS traffic. This is a reasonable assumption today that
(1) large portion of traffic is still unencrypted and (ii) sev-
eral VPN tools [19, 21] are able to successfully “man-in-
ing the packet or obfuscating sensitive information, which is how-
ever, out of scope for this paper.
2This approach allows to train on characteristics of real users, as
it was the case e.g., in [16]. Alternatively, training data can be
obtained by automatically testing mobile apps [20, 18, 17], which
may allow to explore app behavior more systematically. Both ap-
proaches are valuable, but in this paper, we focus on the former.
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Figure 3: Overview of our pipeline for mobile packet classification. During training, the input is a packet trace with HTTP
packets sent from mobile apps to remote destinations, labeled for the Task of interest (A: PII Exposure or B: Ad Request);
the output is a per-app or a general machine learning model, which is trained in a local, centralized or federated way. During
testing, the input is an HTTP packet, and the output is a binary label (indicating the presence or absence of PII or Ad request).
the-middle” and decrypt HTTPS traffic on the mobile device
itself, which is reasonable for the user to trust. As traffic gets
increasingly encrypted and certificate pinning is adopted by
more Android apps, intercepting HTTPS traffic will be more
difficult3 and classifiers will have access only to network
level features (e.g., IP/TCP headers, SNI, etc) rather than
HTTP headers and payload. Federated Learning applies to
that feature space as well, but this is out of scope for this
paper.
3.2 HTTP Features
Figure 4: Example of an HTTP packet in JSON format,
where Android Id, Advertiser Id and zip code are sent by
Bitmoji app to an ad server (doubleclick.net). This packet
would be labeled positive both for PII exposure and for Ad
request. Our HTTP Keys features are highlighted in bold:
these keys are defined by the HTTP protocol and extracted
from (1) the URI query keys (2) the Cookie keys and (3)
custom HTTP headers (e.g., “Bitmoji-User-Agent”’). Com-
pared to baselines (All Words, Recon Words), HTTP Keys do not
use sensitive information such as “city_X”.
3However, there are efforts from big companies, e.g., Facebook,
to enable Developers/Researchers to proxy their own (or generated
with testing accounts) traffic on Android devices [88].
Feature extraction. We build on the approach introduced
by Recon [16] and used in follow-up classifiers [17, 28, 18]:
every HTTP packet is split into words by using delimiter
characters; the resulting words include keys and values from
all HTTP packet headers. Fig. 4 shows an example HTTP
packet from Bitmoji (a mobile app that creates personal avatars),
which sends several identifiers (Android Id, Advertiser Id
and zip code) to an ad server. The question is which of these
words to select as features to predict the presence of PII or
Ad request in a packet, while facilitating Federated Learn-
ing, preserving privacy and meeting other constrains.
There are several challenges when defining this feature
space. First, we need to consider the trade-off between pri-
vacy and classification performance. This implies that we
may not use some words that can help accurately classify
packets, if these features themselves expose sensitive infor-
mation (e.g., part of URLs and domains can contain sensitive
information about user’s political views, medical conditions
or sexual orientation); to that end we do not use any values
as features, only keys. Second, the feature space must have
a small size (for high training speed, low memory and com-
putation overhead for updates) and be fixed and known to
all participating devices in the Federated Learning. Taking
these constraints into account, we consider three different
feature spaces, two baselines and our proposed one:
Baselines: All Words vs. Recon Words [16, 17, 28, 18].
Instead of considering the union of all words as the fea-
ture space (All Words), Recon applied heuristics to remove
the words that appear rarely and the most frequent words
(stopwords, which correspond to standard HTTP headers,
common values such as values parsed from the user_agent
header). This results in removing some but not all values
from consideration. In particular, Recon discards the values
after the “=” delimiter, however certain values that do not
follow this syntax will not be removed from the feature space
and those might contain sensitive information. We refer to
the remaining features as Recon Words. The URI path also
contains potentially sensitive information and words from
URI path are also included in Recon Words. Fig. 4 shows an
example HTTP packet and a subset of the vocabulary of se-
lected as Recon Words, which includes some sensitive values
such as “city_X”.
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Our feature space: HTTP Keys. During Federated Learn-
ing, all mobile devices and the server need to agree on the
model and features they use, and they exchange information
about model parameters. Both the features themselves and
the parameter updates can potentially contain sensitive in-
formation. To avoid that privacy risk, we purposely limit
our feature space to use only non-sensitive keys from HTTP
packets. More specifically, we consider the structure of HTTP
packets and extract features from: (1) the URI query keys,
(2) the Cookie keys, and (3) custom HTTP headers; and (4)
whether or not there is a file request in the packet. We refer
to the collection of these features as HTTP Keys.
First, consider the URI: it typically contains a relative path
on a given domain and queries, usually built using key-value
pairs separated by “&” characters. Sensitive information in
the URI typically appears in relative paths and query values,
while query keys represent API calls to the destination do-
main. We only use query keys as features. We do not extract
any features from the domain and the URI path, since it may
contain sensitive information about the user. Second, we in-
clude keys from the Cookie field. Query keys from these
two fields are sufficient to extract features for most packets
in our datasets.
Third, to differentiate more packets, we extract custom
HTTP headers, which are defined by apps and can embed
sensitive information about users. In recent years, apps have
started using custom headers in order to provide app specific
functionality. We remove the standard HTTP headers [89]
from all HTTP headers in order to retrieve the custom ones.
Fourth, if a packet does not have any keys in the URI
field, Cookie header or custom HTTP headers, we include
file request– a boolean feature that indicates the presence of a
file request. In most cases this will be a benign activity such
as requesting static HTML content. Packets in the datasets
that do not contain any of the four features, which we refer
to as keyless, are excluded from our pipeline.
Feature Space Size. Considering HTTP Keys as features
already reduces the feature space. However, the feature space
size varies widely across apps and users. Different apps have
different APIs (which may lead to different query keys and
custom HTTP headers) and they may contact different des-
tination domains. We differentiate between two broad cat-
egories of apps according to the number of contacted do-
mains: apps with or without Webview. Webview apps can
contact any domain and present web content in the Webview;
examples include browsers or social media apps like Face-
book. Apps without Webview are more likely to only contact
a small fixed set of domains, such as backend servers, ana-
lytic and advertisement services. Apps with Webview present
new challenges, since the feature space could explode with
hundreds of features from every new user, who visits previ-
ously unseen domains. We discuss more about Webview apps
and their impact on the feature space size in Section 4.
Vocabularies. Vocabularies are used in machine learning
models with non-numerical features; in our case the vocabu-
lary is the set of unique words in the dataset. Throughout this
paper, we refer to vocabulary and feature space interchange-
ably. In this paper, we use Multi-hot encoding to represent
the extracted words per packet. A Multi-hot encoding is a
sparse binary vector with the length of the vocabulary such
that it is has 1s at the locations of words in the vector; 0
otherwise. An example is shown at the bottom of Fig. 4.
We use the same feature space for both classification tasks
(Ad request and PII exposure detection), because there is a
relation between the two tasks: apps use PII information for
serving ads.
In Federated Learning, the vocabulary must be fixed and
shared a-priori between all mobile devices and the server.
Recon Words potentially expose sensitive information during
the construction of the shared feature space. Fixing a vocab-
ulary across multiple users is successful when the feature
space is fixed i.e., for apps without Webview. The intuition is
that a single user might not explore the entire API of a ser-
vice, but across multiple users this is more likely to happen.
3.3 Model Selection: Federated SVM
Once the feature space is fixed, our goal is to train a clas-
sifier using Federated Learning. The first step is to select
the classification model, e.g., Decision Trees (DTs), Ran-
dom Forest (RF), Deep Neural Networks (DNNs), Support
Vector Machines (SVMs), etc. The next step is to train that
model in a Federated way (Fig. 1(c)) and compare it to its
Centralized (Fig. 1(b)) and Local versions (Fig. 1(b)). The
choices we evaluate across these two dimensions (i.e., clas-
sification model and degree of collaboration among users)
are summarized under “Model Training” on Fig. 3.
Selecting SVMs as the Classification Model. State-of-
the-art classifiers for mobile packets have trained DTs [16,
28, 18] to predict PII exposure or Ad requests based on fea-
tures extracted from outgoing HTTP packets. DTs were cho-
sen primarily because of their interpretability for small tree
sizes and their efficiency for on-device prediction [17, 28,
18] – most packets are classified after a few levels in the
tree. Unfortunately, DTs do not naturally lend themselves
to federation, since there is no framework for “aggregating”
multiple decision trees collected from multiple devices at the
server. In this paper, we use DTs as baseline centralized
models.
Federated averaging was developed for models based on
Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD), primarily DNNs [29,
30]. In SGD-based models, the mobiles and the server ex-
change gradient updates, and the server simply averages the
local gradients to update the global model. Unfortunately,
DNNs require a large number of samples to train, which is
costly (in device resources and user experience) to obtain
and train on mobile devices.
While Federated Learning is most commonly used to train
DNNs, it applies to any SGD-based model that lends itself
to aggregation at the server. In this paper, we select SVMs.
Compared to DTs: SVMs are SGD-based – thus amenable
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Algorithm 1: Federated SVM
Given K clients (indexed by k); B local minibatch size; E number of
local epochs; R number of global rounds; C fraction of clients and η
learning rate.
Server executes:
Initialize w0
for each round t = 1,2, ... R do
m← max(C ·K, 1)
St ← (random set of m clients)
for each client k ∈ St in parallel do
wkt+1 ← ClientUpdate(k,wt)
wt+1 ←
∑K
k=1
nk
n
wkt+1
ClientUpdate(k,w):
Bk ← (split of local data into batches of size B)
for each local epoch i from 1 to E do
for batch b ∈ Bk do
w ← w − η
B
∑
i∈Bk yi ·xi, when yi(wixi) < 1
return w to server
to federation, achieve similar F1 score (due to the simple
binary vector representation that comes from the multi-hot
encoding) and interpretability (through weight coefficients).
Compared to DNNs: (1) SVMs use fewer parameters which
means less computation, communication and faster training;
(2) Linear Kernel SVMs have convex loss functions where
more principled guarantees can be provided for convergence
during training; (3) SVMs usually perform better than DNNs
on datasets with limited size; (4) SVMs are easier to inter-
pret.
Federated SVM. In this paper, we use Federated SVM
with linear kernels as the core of our federated packet clas-
sification. Linear kernel SVM minimizes the following ob-
jective function, f , over weight vector w:
f(w,X, Y ) =
∑
i
l(w, xi, yi) + λ||w||2, (1)
where xi is the feature vector (i.e., the Multi-hot encoding
for a packet), yi is the binary label and the loss function is
called the Hinge loss: l(w, x, y) = max(0, 1 − y · (w ·x)).
Pegasos previously applied the SGD algorithm for SVM [90].
The Hinge loss function is convex and has the necessary sub-
gradients, i.e., if y ·w ·x < 1, then Ol(w, x, y) = −y ·x,
otherwise 0. This step is easily added to the SGD algorithm,
but more importantly to Federated Averaging [91].
Algorithm 1 shows our algorithm for Federated SVM: we
apply the SVM-based gradient updates to the Federated Av-
eraging algorithm from [91]. Federated SVM trains an SVM
model distributively overK clients (corresponding to mobile
devices), where C fraction of the clients update their model
in each round and all clients update the global model by av-
eraging their model parameters. A client update consists of
multiple local epochs, E, and minibatch split of local data
into B batches similar to standard SGD algorithm. Clients
compute the SGD update based on the above Hinge loss.
The Federated SGD algorithm is a special case of Fed-
erated Averaging for C = 1, E = 1, B = ∞ [91] (i.e.,
use every client in a round with a single pass on all their lo-
cal data once). Usually, we look to push more computation
to the clients by setting E > 1 and B to a small number,
and use a small fraction of clients C in each global round.
[91] explores the trade-off between these hyper-parameters
and shows how to decrease the global number of rounds R
required to reach a target accuracy on the test sets for im-
age classification and next word prediction. The Federated
Learning framework trains a shared model, hence the fea-
ture space has to be fixed and shared across multiple users.
The size of feature space affects parameter updates, and thus
communication costs during model training.
Federated vs. Centralized and Local models. Once we
have fixed the feature space and underlying model (SVM
with linear kernel), we compare the Federated vs. Centralized
and Local models, as shown in overview depicted in Fig. 1.
• Local models are trained on data available on each de-
vice, similar to previous works [16, 17, 28, 18]. Noth-
ing is shared outside the devices, thus preserving pri-
vacy but not classification performance.
• Centralized models: devices upload their training data
to a server, and a global model is trained at the central
server, similar to previous works of AntShield [28, 17],
Recon [16] and NoMoAds [18]. This approach trains bet-
ter classifiers but shares potentially sensitive training
data.
• Federated models: devices do not share training data
with the server, but send model parameter updates to
the server, which then aggregates, updates the global
model and pushes it to all devices; the process repeats
until convergence.
4. DATASETS DESCRIPTION
We use three real-world datasets, summarized on Table 1,
to evaluate the performance of our federated approach, w.r.t.
two packet classification tasks, i.e., PII exposures and Ad
requests.
NoMoAds dataset [18, 31]. The NoMoAds dataset is made
publicly available at [31] by the authors of [18]. It consists
of HTTP and unencrypted HTTPS packets, labeled with ad
requests and PII exposures they may contain, from 50 most
popular apps in the Google Play Store. The data was gen-
erated via manual testing (interacting with each app for five
minutes) with test accounts and there were no human sub-
jects involved. The data was labeled by using state-of-the-
art filterlists [25] of ad serving domains initially and then if
an ad was still appearing during manual testing, a rule was
produced manually via visual inspection to detect ads in the
last few packets. NoMoAds is the only dataset that contains
state-of-the-art labels for advertising.
AntShield dataset [28, 17, 32]. The AntShield dataset is
made publicly available at [32] by the authors of [28, 17].
This dataset contains HTTP and HTTPS packets labeled to
indicate if they contain a PII exposure or not. W.r.t. PII
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Prior Work HTTP Keys
Dataset #Apps/Users #Packets #Ads/PII #Features #URI #Cookie #Custom #File #Keyless #Destination TimeAll/Recon Words keys keys Headers Requests POST Packets Domains
NoMoAds 50/(synthetic) 15,351 4,866/4,427 12,511/6,743 2,580 216 204 3,342 2,334/2,123 366 2017
AntShield 297/(synthetic) 41,757 -/8,170 39,304/19,778 3,855 302 609 4,644 8,836/777 674 2017
In-house 1/8 real 84,716 -/3,424 40,936/22,714 7,573 3,591 47 12,903 13,786/153 1,607 2015Chrome
In-house 1/10 real 33,580 -/1,347 11,921/6,718 4,370 1,160 19 172 12/0 861 2015Facebook
Table 1: Summary of each dataset in terms of features (our HTTP Keys method vs. Recon Words vs. All Words), total amount of
data, users, visited domains and supported classification tasks.
it is similar to NoMoAds dataset but it is richer since it con-
tains data from more apps for the PII task. The data was
generated with manual and automated testing. The manual
tests included interacting for five minutes with the top 100
most popular apps (according to AppAnnie [92]). The auto-
mated tests included top 400 apps and a monkey script [93]
was performing 1,000 random actions over ten minutes per
app. We combine the AntShield data generated from man-
ual and automated testing to a single dataset, from which
we consider the 297 apps out of 400, that generated HTTP
or HTTPS traffic. We would like to note that there are other
publicly available datasets with PII labels, i.e., extended dataset
with many apps and their different versions during 8 years
[41], however this dataset does not include logs from all
HTTP fields packets and it would be impossible to extract
our chosen features from URI and Cookie fields and the
presence of custom headers. Another publicly available dataset
is [94] with labeled HTTP packets. However, the mapping
of packets to the app that generated it, is not reliable and
since we sample the data per app in order to create synthetic
users, we decided to use the AntShield dataset as an example
dataset for PII task.
In-house Datasets with real users. This is a dataset we
collected in-house from 10 real users who contributed their
packet traces for a period of 7 months4. The packet traces
were collected by running Antmonitor [22]: an open-source
VPN-based tool that intercepts outgoing network traffic gen-
erated from each Android app. In order to run our machine
learning algorithms, we have preprocessed the raw packet
traces into JSON, by keeping only HTTP packet-level in-
formation. We redacted all user sensitive information with a
prefix and the type of PII it contained (e.g., prefix_email) and
labeled the packets with exposures if they contained one of
these scrubbed PII exposures. To evaluate Federated Learn-
ing, we consider the two most popular apps across all ten
users, which are Chrome and Facebook with 8 and 10 users
in total respectively. We consider each of these two apps as
a separate dataset: in-house Chrome and in-house Facebook.
Packet Classification Tasks. In all three datasets, a packet
is considered to have a PII exposure, if it contains some per-
sonally identifiable information (PII), including the follow-
4The study was approved by the University of California Irvine’s
Institutional Review Board (IRB).
ing: (i) device identifiers, such as IMEI, Device ID, phone
number, serial number, ICCID, MAC Address; (ii) user iden-
tifiers such as first/last name, Advertiser ID, email, phone
number; (iii) Location: latitude and longitude coordinates,
city, zip code. This is a subset of PII as defined in prior
work, but our framework can be used to detect additional PII
types if the corresponding labeled ground truth is provided.
If a packet contains at least one of these sensitive fields, we
assign label 1 to the packet, otherwise 0. For the ad predic-
tion task, if a packet contains an Ad Request it is labeled as
1, otherwise 0. These labels are available for each packet in
the datasets considered.
Summary of the Datasets. Table 1 summarizes the fea-
ture space, as relevant to our federated learning framework,
including: total number of unique features (URI keys, Coo-
kie keys and custom HTTP headers), total number of pack-
ets, total keyless packets and how many of them were POST
requests, total packets that contain a file request only but no
other feature, and unique destination domains.We do not in-
clude HTTP POST packets in our training or testing, for key-
less packets, i.e., packets without any features (query keys in
the URI or Cookie field, custom HTTP headers, or file re-
quest). There is no standardized syntax for the POST body
in order to obtain only the keys without parsing the values
too. Therefore, for privacy reasons we decided to not parse
them at all and to discard such packets from our experiments.
The AntShield dataset contains the most apps and packets
with a PII exposure (8,170), while in-house Chrome contains
the most packets (84,716) and the highest number of unique
domains (1,607). In the NoMoAds dataset, the feature space
has 12,511 features with All Words from the HTTP packet (in-
cluding values) and 6,743 using Recon Words. On the other
hand, HTTP Keys uses only 3,001 features (Table 1: sum of
URI, Cookie keys, custom headers + 1 for file request), which
is less than half of the Recon Words. Similarly, in the AntShield
dataset the feature space increases from 4,767 with HTTP-
Keys, to 19,778 Recon Words and to 39,304 with All Words.
This explosion of feature space affects the training speed,
the size of the trained models and might expose sensitive in-
formation of user data (i.e., values to sensitive keys). The
benefit of our HTTP Keys approach is the following: (1) our
significantly reduced feature space can describe both predic-
tion tasks (Ads and PII), (2) users share limited sensitive in-
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Figure 5: Number of features and domains for the top 12
apps with most features from our in-house dataset. The num-
ber of features correlates with number of visited domains.
Chrome Intersection Union #Packets #Domainsfeatures features
In-house 370 11,212 84,716 1,607
AntShield - 75 206 15
NoMoAds - - - -
Facebook Intersection Union #Packets #Domainsfeatures features
In-house 14 5,550 33,580 861
AntShield - 63 110 4
NoMoAds - 820 392 82
Table 2: Two Webview apps and comparison of their feature
space in our datasets. We present the intersection/union of
features, number of packets and domains across all datasets.
formation, without sacrificing classification accuracy and (3)
the reduced number of features leads to smaller models and
faster training, which is important in mobile environments.
Webview vs. non-Webview apps. Figure. 5 shows the dis-
tribution of features and domains for the top 12 apps with
most features from our in-house dataset. There is a pos-
itive correlation between the number of features and vis-
ited domains for each app. Webview apps, such as Facebook
and Chrome, have the most features, as expected. Table 2
shows the feature space for Chrome and Facebook in all our
datasets. The feature space of Webview apps depends on the
usage of each app, e.g., the duration (in terms of packets),
user behavior (in terms of domains visited). We observe the
explosion of the feature space in our in-house dataset, where
Chrome has only 370 shared features across 8 users, but the
union has 11,212. Similarly, the Facebook app has only 14
common out of 5,550 features across 10 users. In contrast,
non-Webview apps have smaller feature spaces due to their
limited number of contacted domains. In this paper, we as-
sume that the datasets contain all possible visited domains
and the feature set is fixed.
5. RESULTS
General Setup. Table 3 lists the possible options for
evaluation based on our pipeline defined in Section 3. We
compare the Federated model to Local and Centralized models
Pipeline Options
Dataset: NoMoAds AntShield In-house ChromeFacebook
Users: Real users Even split Uneven splitwith k users with k users
Classifier (Per domain) Per App GeneralGranularity:
Models: Federated SVM Local SVM Centralized SVM/baselines
Tasks: PII exposure Ad request
Table 3: Parameters of the Evaluation Setup.
where the test data comes either from a user or is the union
of test data from all users. We train only general and per-
app models, but no per-domain model (as there can be too
many domains and it would be impractical to train a sepa-
rate model for each). In each scenario, we describe the eval-
uation setup, rationale and results in terms of classification
accuracy, communication and computation cost.
To evaluate the classification performance, we split the
available data into 80% train and 20% test data in order to
compute F1 score [95] on the positive class (i.e., Ad request
or PII exposure is detected). Furthermore, in each of the
experiment scenarios, we apply standard machine learning
techniques to train efficient classifiers. Before training, we
balance our dataset so that it contains an even amount of
positive and negative examples to avoid training with a bias
towards the most frequent class. For each of the following
experiments we train and test five times each model (unless
otherwise mentioned) to obtain an average F1 score.
Creating synthetic users. NoMoAds and AntShield datasets
do not come from real users, since they were produced man-
ually by their corresponding authors or automatically via
running monkey scripts with random actions. We create syn-
thetic users by sampling from the available data in order to
test our Federated approach for packet classification. We de-
veloped two different approaches to partition the data into k
synthetic users: a random split into equal amounts of data
(even split) and a random split of data with random sizes of
sampled data so that each user contains a different amount
of packets (uneven split). For the uneven split, we used a min-
imum threshold, 30%, of available app data to be assigned
to each user. We test both methods and show their results,
since the advantage of Federated Learning is that it can han-
dle various distributions of data across participating users.
For both synthetic and real users, we apply the train and
test split per user to train Local, Centralized or Federated clas-
sifiers. In addition, we show in Section 5.4, that training on
a subset of users can provide good classifiers for all users.
5.1 Scenario 1: Centralized Models
Setup 1. In this experiment, we use the following setup
from Table 3: Dataset: NoMoAds. Users: None. Classi-
fier Granularity: General. Models: Centralized SVM (lin-
ear and non-linear kernel, SGD) and baselines (DT, RF).
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Figure 6: uneven split of NoMoAds across 5 synthetic users.
Tasks: PII exposure and Ad request. The goal is to validate
our choice of Federated model (SVM with SGD) and feature
space (HTTP Keys and file request) in the rest of the paper.
Results 1a: HTTP Keys vs. Recon Words features. In
Table 4, we compare various Centralized classifiers on four
different feature spaces: HTTP Keys (3,000 features), HTTP-
Keys with file request, Recon Words (6,580 features), All Words
(12,195 features). HTTP Keys with file request uses a smaller
feature space (3,001 features) but achieves an F1 score above
0.94 and 0.85 for PII and Ads, respectively.
Adding the file request feature includes more packets which
results in a classification loss of approximately 8% and 3%
for Ads and PII prediction accordingly. The drop in perfor-
mance is slightly larger in case of Ad predictions, since our
feature space does not include information about domains
that is important for this task as shown in [18]. Prior work
[16, 17, 28, 18] uses domain information in addition to other
potentially sensitive features, and achieves higher F1 score.
There is always a trade-off between privacy and utility, how-
ever, our defined feature space and the distributed framework
are good steps towards private packet classification, without
significant loss in classification performance.
Results 1b: SVM with SGD performs similarly to De-
cision Trees. We compare SVM with SGD to state-of-the-
art baseline models, such as Decision Trees and Random
Forest (used in AntShield [17], Recon [16], NoMoAds [18]).
Table 4 compares their performance on the NoMoAds dataset.
For all feature spaces (i) the linear SVM and SVM with SGD
perform similarly to Decision Tree and Random Forest; and
(ii) SVM with a non-linear kernel (rbf) seems to not gen-
eralize well and it is likely to overfit to data. Therefore, we
select SVM with SGD as the basis of our Federated Learning
framework.
5.2 Scenario 2: NoMoAds for PII, Ad Request
Setup 2a. We use the following setup from Table 3. Dataset:
NoMoAds.Users: Even and Uneven split across 5 synthetic
users; the distribution of data for uneven split is depicted on
Fig.6. Classifier Granularity: General. Models: Federated
SVM vs. Centralized SVM. Tasks: PII exposure and Ad re-
quest. We set local epochs to E = 5, batch size to B = 10
and we use all users by setting the fraction C = 1.0, as
we use only 5 synthetic users due to the limited size of the
dataset.
Results 2a: Federated vs. Centralized vs. Local. Table 5
shows the classification performance (F1 score), where the
Federated model performs as well as the Centralized model
and significantly outperforms the Local models. In particu-
lar, Federated training performs similarly to the same model
trained in Centralized way on the union of all users’ data.
Moreover, the F1 score of the Federated model on each indi-
vidual user’s test data is slightly higher than their Local mod-
els, especially for the uneven split. For uneven split, the aver-
age number of rounds required to reach such F1 score for the
Ads prediction is 8.8, while for PII prediction 1 round was
sufficient to reach F1 score = 0.96. For even split, the aver-
age number of rounds required to reach such F1 score is 2.6
for the Ads prediction and 2.2 rounds for the PII prediction.
Setup 2b. This is similar to Setup 2a, but the data is split
into 20, instead of 5, synthetic users. For B = ∞, we use
all available data without any minibatches, similarly to [29].
We require all models to reach a target F1 score on test set
(0.85 and 0.95 for Ads and PII predictions respectively); we
select these F1 score targets to match the performance of
Centralized models shown in Table 4 for each task.
Results 2b: Impact of Federated parameters. Table 6
shows how the average number of rounds (R), until the mod-
els reach the target F1 score, depends on the fraction of par-
ticipating clients (C), a different batch size (B) and local
epochs (E). A general trend is that increasing the C parame-
ter, the average number of rounds decreases significantly and
the gap between min and max decreases. Moreover, increas-
ing the batch size decreases the number of rounds, as small
batch size helps the model to converge faster. These obser-
vations apply to both uneven and even splits and to both pre-
diction tasks. On the other hand, increasing the local epochs
and pushing computation to users increases the number of
rounds, except for the case when C = 1.0. The reason for
this is that our model is simple and more local epochs lead to
overfitting. The main parameter that significantly affects the
number of communication rounds is C. This is expected and
the effects of C can be understood in the following way: us-
ing fewer clients in a round requires less communication per
round, but similar amount of computation is required to train
our models, hence the increased number of rounds. How-
ever, in the context of mobile packet classification, the num-
ber of rounds is much lower than observed for more com-
plex models in related work [91] and remains around 10 for
C = 0.2.
5.3 Scenario 3: AntShield for PII Prediction
Setup 3. We use the following setup from Table 3. Dataset:
AntShield. Users: Even vs. Uneven split with 5 synthetic
users. Classifier Granularity: General. Models: Federated
SVM vs. Centralized SVM, Tasks: PII exposure. We set
B = 10, E = 5, C = 1.0, similarly to Setup 2.
Results 3. Table 7 shows the results. For even split of
data, the Federated model has an F1 score of 0.94 when it is
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Feature Space (# Features) HTTP Keys (3000) HTTP Keys + file request (3001) Recon Words (6,580) All Words (12,195)
Task Ads PII Ads PII Ads PII Ads PII
Centralized Classifier F1 score F1 score F1 score F1 score F1 score F1 score F1 score F1 score
Decision Tree (DT) 0.936 0.98 0.854 0.95 0.98 0.984 0.979 0.983
Random Forest (RF) 0.938 0.981 0.861 0.949 0.982 0.986 0.979 0.987
SVM with SGD 0.929 0.975 0.838 0.944 0.971 0.981 0.975 0.979
SVM linear kernel 0.933 0.979 0.857 0.952 0.984 0.984 0.981 0.984
SVM rbf kernel 0.706 0.762 0.625 0.744 0.785 0.756 0.761 0.719
Table 4: Results 1a and 1b. The performance of various ML models on the NoMoAds dataset for the two tasks: Ads and PII
prediction. The reported F1 score is averaged, after training and testing each model 5 times. We show that SVM with SGD
performs as well as DT and RF. We increase the feature space (packet information used) from left to right. HTTP Keys results
in significant reduction in the number of features, while achieving high F1 score for PII (0.94) and for Ads prediction (0.85).
Uneven split Even split
F1 score F1 score
Trained on Tested on Ads PII Ads PII
Federated user 0 test 0.83 0.96 0.84 0.95
Federated user 1 test 0.92 0.96 0.81 0.95
Federated user 2 test 0.86 0.95 0.84 0.95
Federated user 3 test 0.63 0.97 0.88 0.92
Federated user 4 test 0.85 0.96 0.86 0.96
Federated all test data 0.84 0.96 0.85 0.95
Local user 0 user 0 test 0.82 0.95 0.78 0.9
Local user 1 user 1 test 0.89 0.94 0.8 0.92
Local user 2 user 2 test 0.8 0.9 0.79 0.93
Local user 3 user 3 test 0.64 0.82 0.83 0.9
Local user 4 user 4 test 0.77 0.87 0.81 0.91
Centralized all test data 0.85 0.96 0.84 0.94
Table 5: Results 2a. Federated performs as well as Centra-
lized training and significantly outperforms Local models. We
show the F1 score for each user, when testing on (i) their
hold-out test data and on (ii) the union of all users test data.
tested on the union of user test sets, while the corresponding
Centralized model has an F1 score = 0.96, achieved within 5.8
rounds on average. For the uneven split of data among users,
the Federated model achieves the same F1 score = 0.94, but
slightly slower (in 6.6 rounds). We observe that some users
achieve lower F1 score on their corresponding Local models,
which is expected as these users have much less data and es-
pecially positive examples, because of the skewness of data
in the uneven split. In summary, we show that even with a
different dataset, our Federated approach still performs well
when compared to its corresponding Centralized model for
both types of splits, with a small difference in communica-
tion rounds to achieve the same F1 score.
5.4 Scenario 4: In-house Datasets for PII Pre-
diction
Setup 4. We use the following setup from Table 3: Dataset:
In-house Chrome, Facebook. Users: 10 real users. Classifier
Granularity: Per App. Models: Federated SVM vs. Centra-
lized SVM. Tasks: PII exposure. The goal is to evaluate our
Federated framework (1) on real user activity (instead of sys-
tematic tests of apps) and (2) over a longer time period (7
months instead of five/ten minutes). Figure 7 shows the dis-
——- Uneven split ——- —— Even split ——
C B =∞ B = 10 B =∞ B = 10
Task: Ads with target F1 score = 0.85, E = 1
0.05 36.6 [24, 58] 22.4 [11, 29] 25 [19, 30] 33.4 [25, 43]
0.1 15 [10, 20] 15.2 [9, 24] 14 [11, 23] 23 [13, 34]
0.2 10 [8, 13] 6.8 [5, 10] 8.6 [7, 14] 11 [6, 17]
0.5 2.6 [2, 4] 3 [2, 4] 4.4 [3, 6] 8 [6, 11]
1.0 1.6 [1, 2] 2.4 [1, 4] 2.6 [2, 4] 4.8 [4, 6]
Task: Ads with target F1 score = 0.85, E = 5
0.05 43.6 [40, 48] 49 [27, 75] 34.8 [27, 53] 48.8 [43, 63]
0.1 21.2 [13, 28] 20.8 [17, 26] 22.6 [19, 27] 22.4 [18, 27]
0.2 12 [8, 15] 10 [7, 11] 9.2 [8, 12] 10.6 [10, 12]
0.5 3.4 [2, 6] 4.2 [3, 5] 3.8 [3, 5] 5.6 [3, 11]
1.0 1 [1, 1] 1.2 [1, 2] 2.8 [2, 6] 3.4 [2, 7]
Task: PII with target F1 score = 0.95, E = 1
0.05 30 [19, 37]] 28.8 [21, 40] 27.8 [21, 33] 27.8 [23, 31]
0.1 14.2 [9, 18] 15.6 [12, 18] 16.4 [13, 19] 16.8 [16, 18]
0.2 7.4 [4, 9] 7.4 [5, 12] 7.4 [6, 9] 7.2 [6, 10]
0.5 3.6 [3, 5] 3.6 [3, 5] 3.6 [3, 4] 3.4 [3, 4]
1.0 1.8 [1, 2] 2 [2, 2] 2.8 [2, 3] 2.6 [2, 3]
Task: PII with target F1 score = 0.95, E = 5
0.05 39.6 [32, 44] 48.4 [35, 58] 34.6 [31, 40] 39.2 [31, 44]
0.1 21.6 [16, 37] 20.2 [14, 27] 16.2 [14, 17] 20.2 [18, 22]
0.2 9.4 [7, 14] 10.4 [8, 16] 7.8 [7, 8] 9.2 [7, 11]
0.5 3.2 [2, 5] 3.6 [3, 5] 3 [3, 3] 3.2 [3, 4]]
1.0 1 [1, 1] 1.2 [1, 2] 1.2 [1, 2] 1 [1, 1]
Table 6: Results 2b. Impact of Federated parameters. Con-
sider the NoMoAds dataset split into 20 synthetic users. All
models are trained until they reach a target F1 score (selected
to match Centralized for the same task). We vary the Federated
parameters C, B, E and we report the communication cost
(number of rounds, R) until the target F1 score is reached:
average and [min, max] are reported over 5 runs.
tribution of Chrome and Facebook packets (including labels)
present across the 10 real users in our in-house dataset.
Results 4a. Table 8 shows the classification performance
of the Centralized and Federated models for Chrome and Face-
book, with certain parameters. Chrome’s Federated model
achieves F1 score = 0.84 compared to its Centralized F1 score
= 0.92. Facebook’s Federated model maintains similar F1-
score (0.94) compared to its Centralized version (0.95).
Results 4b. In Table 9, we evaluate the impact of batch
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Trained on Tested on Uneven split Even splitF1 score F1 score
Federated user 0 test 0.91 0.93
Federated user 1 test 0.94 0.95
Federated user 2 test 0.95 0.94
Federated user 3 test 0.95 0.91
Federated user 4 test 0.93 0.93
Federated all test data 0.93 0.93
Local user 0 user 0 test 0.92 0.89
Local user 1 user 1 test 0.91 0.91
Local user 2 user 2 test 0.93 0.92
Local user 3 user 3 test 0.87 0.87
Local user 4 user 4 test 0.85 0.89
Centralized all test data 0.94 0.94
Table 7: Results 3. AntShield dataset for predicting PII ex-
posures, for 5 synthetic users created with uneven and even
split of data. The F1 score is averaged from 5 runs for
C = 1.0, B = 10, E = 5.
Figure 7: Distribution of packets for Facebook and Chrome.
Chrome Facebook
Model F1 score R [min, max] F1 score R [min, max]
Federated 0.84 94 [9, 212] 0.94 33.2 [5, 113]
Centralized 0.92 N/A 0.95 N/A
Table 8: Results 4a. PII prediction for Chrome, Facebook.
We report the average F1 score and the number of rounds, R
(avg [min, max]) required to achieve that F1 score. We set
C = 0.5, B = 10, E = 5.
size (B) and local epochs (E) on the communication rounds
required to achieve a target F1 score for Chrome and Face-
book. We run each experiment five times in order to obtain
the average number of rounds required and the min, max
values. We observe that increasing the batch size increases
slightly the average number of rounds to achieve the target
F1 score, while increasing the E parameter increases the
number of rounds significantly. The reason is that we use
a simple model and most likely the model overfits with large
epoch values. In the original Federated Learning paper [29],
the authors showed the opposite effect: increasing the local
epochs decreases the number of rounds; however, they train
DNNs that require more complexity and do not overfit for
those E values. Moreover, we observe that the batch size
(B) does not significantly affect the number of rounds re-
E B R: avg [min, max]
Facebook Chrome
1 10 16 [6, 31] 7 [4, 10]
1 20 20.2 [12, 41] 6.4 [5, 11]
1 40 15.6 [8, 27] 5 [4, 7]]
1 ∞ 9 [6, 14] 6.2 [4, 11]
5 10 33.2 [5, 113] 82 [14, 200]
5 20 37.6 [20, 46] 27 [3, 61]
5 40 39.6 [8, 97] 25.6 [8, 55]
5 ∞ 26 [3, 47] 23.2 [6, 56]
10 10 53.8 [4, 190] 756.2 [531, 800]
10 20 71.6 [12, 200] -
10 ∞ 72.8 [21, 146] 283.2 [126, 800]
Table 9: Results 4b. We report the average [minimum, max-
imum] number of communication rounds (R) required to
achieve a target F1 score of 0.94 and 0.84 for Facebook and
Chrome, respectively. We vary the parameters batch size (B)
and number of local epochs (E) to evaluate their impact on
the average number of rounds, with fixed C = 0.5. If the
target F1 score is not reached within 800 rounds for none of
the 5 runs, we assume that it does not converge.
quired. However, the number of local epochs (E) plays an
important role in the model’s convergence, which we further
explore next.
Results 4c: Convergence of Federated models. Figure 8
shows the performance of Federated SVM for Facebook and
Chrome when we vary the local epochs, E. We set the frac-
tion of client C = 0.5 and batch size B = 10. We train each
model with an E value five times and report the average and
standard deviation (in shadowed color). The main difference
between the two apps is that the F1 score of the Federated
model is closer to the Centralized one for Facebook. How-
ever, the standard deviation is much larger than Chrome’s.
In addition, E = 1 for Chrome can reach a better F1 score =
0.89 than in the previous experiments, because of the lower
E value. We observe that the Federated model is more sensi-
tive to the E parameter, which leads to overfitting for SVM.
Results 4d: Benefit of Crowdsourcing. We ask the ques-
tion: how many users need to collaborate in training a global
model in order to get most of the predictive power? Figure
9 shows that a few users participating in the training phase
during Federated learning can be beneficial for all users. We
show the maximum average F1 score obtained from five runs,
as a function of the number of users (k) participating in train-
ing. The F1 score is evaluated both on all user’s test data
and on the test data of k users who participated in the train-
ing. We sort the users by increasing amount of training data.
For example, when k = 1, one user with the fewest data
points participates in training. When k = 2, in addition to
the previous user, another user with more data is used during
training. More users in the training phase is beneficial to in-
crease the F1 score for both apps. However, there are some
users who do not help with their data and slightly worsen
the F1 score, as their data might confuse the classifier. For
Facebook, we need to add at least 3 users in order to obtain
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Figure 8: Results 4c. Convergence of F1 score over R com-
munication rounds for the Facebook and Chrome Federated
classifiers. We fix C = 0.5, B = 10 and vary E. Models
are trained 5 times, and shaded regions represent the stan-
dard deviation from the average F1 score. Their Centralized
models reach F1 score 0.95 and 0.92 (dashed line).
a decent F1 score, while Chrome reaches the same F1 score
with only 2 users. The F1 score on the test data of k users
is much higher than on the union of all users’ test data, as
the models only fit to the data available for the participating
users. The lack of generalization is one of the reasons that
Webview apps are a challenging special case in the mobile
packet classification problem. However, both Chrome and
Facebook train Federated models that generalize well with
F1 score of over 0.80, if enough users with useful (diverse)
data participate in training.
5.5 Scenario 5: Interpreting SVM vs. DT
Setup 5. We use the following setup from Table 3: Dataset:
NoMoAds. Users: None. Classifier Granularity: General.
Models: Centralized SVM vs. DT. Tasks: PII exposure. Prior
work chose DT over other models partially because of their
interpretability. In our context, these models learn simi-
lar separation of our datasets, which we demonstrate by (1)
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Figure 9: Results 4d. Benefit of crowdsourcing for Chrome
and Facebook, where k users participate in training. We sort
users in increasing amount of training data they contribute.
Federated parameters: C = 1.0, E = 5, B = 10. The aver-
age F1 score is shown for all users’ test data (thin line) and
for test data of k users (bold line).
Figure 10: Top 10 negative and positive coefficients and the
corresponding features obtained from Centralized SVM.
observing the most important coefficients in SVM, (2) by
knowledge transfer from SVM to DT. The goal here is to
compare SVM to DT in terms of their interpretability.
Results 5. Figure 10 presents the ten most important ne-
gative and positive coefficients and their corresponding fea-
tures for our Centralized SVM model. In order to distinguish
important features, we use the model’s coefficients, where
the positive ones correspond to the features whose presence
leads to positive labels and the negative coefficients corre-
spond to features responsible for predicting label 0 (e.g., No
PII detected). This is not a one-to-one mapping of important
features between SVM and DT due to their internal repre-
sentation of features. However, we observe certain keys that
are responsible for PII exposures such as “gaid”, that also
appear in the corresponding Decision Tree.
Figure 11(b) shows the DT after knowledge transfer from
SVM. To perform knowledge transfer from SVM to DT, we
first split the data into 40% for training SVM, another 40%
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(a) Decision Tree (DT) trained on its own.
(b) First train SVM, then transfer knowledge to DT.
Figure 11: Interpretability of DT vs. SVM in Setup 5. Due
to lack of space, we show zoomed-in versions of these DTs
in Appendix A.
for training a DT, which is labeled with predictions from
the aforementioned SVM. The remaining 20% of the data
is used for testing. This is one way to leverage the inter-
pretability of Decision Trees via knowledge transfer from
SVM. In Fig. 11(a), we show a Decision Tree which was
trained with NoMoAds for PII prediction, while in Fig. 11(b),
we show the DT after knowledge transfer from SVM. We
observe that both DTs, at least at the top levels, have similar
important features and thus, capture similar patterns. The
original DT and SVM reached F1 score = 0.95 and the af-
ter knowledge transfer DT reached F1 score = 0.94 on the
same test data. This is only a minor F1 score loss during
knowledge transfer.
The most notable difference between the trees in Fig. 11 is
the lack of a large branch that only predicts label 0, which is
the result of how the original tree unsuccessfully attempts to
separate data. However, the DT after the knowledge transfer
is oblivious to this error, since the SVM most likely suffers
from the same issue as the original DT. Such errors propagat-
ing from the SVM make the DT after the knowledge transfer
smaller (269 vs. 141 nodes) than the original DT.
6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Summary. This paper proposes, for the first time, a Fed-
erated Learning framework for Mobile Packet Classification,
and evaluates its effectiveness and efficiency, using three
real-world datasets and two different tasks (namely PII ex-
posure and Ad request). First, we proposed a reduced fea-
ture space (HTTP Keys), which limits the sensitive informa-
tion shared by users. Then, we showed that SVM with SGD
performs similarly to Decision Trees used by state-of-the-art
[16, 17, 28], in terms of F1 score as well as interpretabil-
ity. We also showed that Federated achieves a significantly
higher F1 score than Local and is comparable to Centralized
models, and it does so within a few communication rounds
and with minimal computation per user, which is important
in the mobile environment.
Future work. There are several directions for future work.
First, we plan to study the exploding feature space of Web-
view apps due to temporal and user dynamics. Second, we
will seek to evaluate our framework in larger datasets, which
would also allows us to train and evaluate DNNs. Third, we
will explore ways to handle encrypted traffic (e.g., by fo-
cusing on network features, SNI, domain embeddings, etc).
Fourth, we will consider well-known privacy attacks to Fed-
erated Learning (model parameter updates can still contain
sensitive information) and mechanisms (Secure Aggregation
[96] or Differential Privacy [82]) that can be added on top
of Federated Learning, which were considered out of scope
for this paper. In future work, we are interested in optimiz-
ing the design of such mechanisms specifically for the mo-
bile classification problem. Fifth, we will leverage knowl-
edge transfer from SVMs to deploy DT classifiers on mobile,
which have been previously implemented efficiently on the
device [17], thanks to the simple DT rules. Related to that,
we plan to implement our method directly on mobile phones
and possibly leverage the recently announced open source
framework for Federated Learning, TensorFlow Federated
[97], which can be done on top of open source VPN tools
[17, 18]. A mobile implementation would provide us with
evaluation on real-world resource consumption. Finally, our
general framework can be applied towards other packet clas-
sification tasks, beyond PII and Ad prediction, such as e.g.,
fingerprinting, provided there are labeled packet traces to
train on.
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A. ADDITIONAL FIGURES
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Figure 12: Zoomed-in version of Fig. 11(b), showing a Decision Tree (DT) after knowledge transfer from an SVM.
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gini = 0.397
samples = 44
value = [32, 12]
class = 0
gini = 0.0
samples = 1
value = [1, 0]
class = 0
gini = 0.402
samples = 43
value = [31, 12]
class = 0
gini = 0.0
samples = 1
value = [1, 0]
class = 0
gini = 0.0
samples = 3
value = [0, 3]
class = 1
gini = 0.0
samples = 1
value = [1, 0]
class = 0
gini = 0.0
samples = 16
value = [0, 16]
class = 1
gini = 0.0
samples = 2
value = [2, 0]
class = 0
googleadid <= 0.5
gini = 0.334
samples = 85
value = [18, 67]
class = 1
gini = 0.0
samples = 6
value = [6, 0]
class = 0
coppa <= 0.5
gini = 0.358
samples = 77
value = [18, 59]
class = 1
gini = 0.0
samples = 8
value = [0, 8]
class = 1
access_token <= 0.5
gini = 0.336
samples = 75
value = [16, 59]
class = 1
gini = 0.0
samples = 2
value = [2, 0]
class = 0
sdk <= 0.5
gini = 0.327
samples = 73
value = [15, 58]
class = 1
gini = 0.5
samples = 2
value = [1, 1]
class = 0
gini = 0.0
samples = 2
value = [0, 2]
class = 1
gini = 0.333
samples = 71
value = [15, 56]
class = 1
cx <= 0.5
gini = 0.043
samples = 46
value = [1, 45]
class = 1
gini = 0.0
samples = 2
value = [2, 0]
class = 0
gini = 0.0
samples = 45
value = [0, 45]
class = 1
gini = 0.0
samples = 1
value = [1, 0]
class = 0
model <= 0.5
gini = 0.243
samples = 92
value = [13, 79]
class = 1
gini = 0.0
samples = 5
value = [5, 0]
class = 0
storeidver <= 0.5
gini = 0.14
samples = 79
value = [6, 73]
class = 1
adid <= 0.5
gini = 0.497
samples = 13
value = [7, 6]
class = 0
#customheader_zedge-sigt <= 0.5
gini = 0.12
samples = 78
value = [5, 73]
class = 1
gini = 0.0
samples = 1
value = [1, 0]
class = 0
#customheader_x-zedge-retries <= 0.5
gini = 0.098
samples = 77
value = [4, 73]
class = 1
gini = 0.0
samples = 1
value = [1, 0]
class = 0
e <= 0.5
gini = 0.053
samples = 73
value = [2, 71]
class = 1
gini = 0.5
samples = 4
value = [2, 2]
class = 0
gini = 0.0
samples = 20
value = [0, 20]
class = 1
gini = 0.073
samples = 53
value = [2, 51]
class = 1
gini = 0.0
samples = 7
value = [7, 0]
class = 0
gini = 0.0
samples = 6
value = [0, 6]
class = 1
gini = 0.0
samples = 96
value = [0, 96]
class = 1
gini = 0.0
samples = 1
value = [1, 0]
class = 0
timezone <= 0.5
gini = 0.029
samples = 69
value = [1, 68]
class = 1
gini = 0.0
samples = 141
value = [0, 141]
class = 1
gini = 0.0
samples = 68
value = [0, 68]
class = 1
gini = 0.0
samples = 1
value = [1, 0]
class = 0
debug <= 0.5
gini = 0.063
samples = 337
value = [326, 11]
class = 0
gini = 0.0
samples = 14
value = [0, 14]
class = 1
adspace_height <= 0.5
gini = 0.03
samples = 331
value = [326, 5]
class = 0
gini = 0.0
samples = 6
value = [0, 6]
class = 1
#customheader_upgrade-insecure-requests <= 0.5
gini = 0.018
samples = 329
value = [326, 3]
class = 0
gini = 0.0
samples = 2
value = [0, 2]
class = 1
#cookiekey__gid <= 0.5
gini = 0.022
samples = 266
value = [263, 3]
class = 0
gini = 0.0
samples = 63
value = [63, 0]
class = 0
#cookiekey_PHPSESSID <= 0.5
gini = 0.024
samples = 244
value = [241, 3]
class = 0
gini = 0.0
samples = 22
value = [22, 0]
class = 0
t <= 0.5
gini = 0.026
samples = 228
value = [225, 3]
class = 0
gini = 0.0
samples = 16
value = [16, 0]
class = 0
#cookiekey_ck1 <= 0.5
gini = 0.027
samples = 218
value = [215, 3]
class = 0
gini = 0.0
samples = 10
value = [10, 0]
class = 0
id <= 0.5
gini = 0.028
samples = 209
value = [206, 3]
class = 0
gini = 0.0
samples = 9
value = [9, 0]
class = 0
#cookiekey_gig_hasGmid <= 0.5
gini = 0.029
samples = 201
value = [198, 3]
class = 0
gini = 0.0
samples = 8
value = [8, 0]
class = 0
#cookiekey__utastes_1 <= 0.5
gini = 0.031
samples = 193
value = [190, 3]
class = 0
gini = 0.0
samples = 8
value = [8, 0]
class = 0
#cookiekey_IDE <= 0.5
gini = 0.032
samples = 185
value = [182, 3]
class = 0
gini = 0.0
samples = 8
value = [8, 0]
class = 0
v <= 0.5
gini = 0.033
samples = 178
value = [175, 3]
class = 0
gini = 0.0
samples = 7
value = [7, 0]
class = 0
#cookiekey_v2regbstage <= 0.5
gini = 0.034
samples = 171
value = [168, 3]
class = 0
gini = 0.0
samples = 7
value = [7, 0]
class = 0
#cookiekey_UIDR <= 0.5
gini = 0.036
samples = 165
value = [162, 3]
class = 0
gini = 0.0
samples = 6
value = [6, 0]
class = 0
data <= 0.5
gini = 0.037
samples = 161
value = [158, 3]
class = 0
gini = 0.0
samples = 4
value = [4, 0]
class = 0
rand <= 0.5
gini = 0.037
samples = 157
value = [154, 3]
class = 0
gini = 0.0
samples = 4
value = [4, 0]
class = 0
rnd <= 0.5
gini = 0.038
samples = 154
value = [151, 3]
class = 0
gini = 0.0
samples = 3
value = [3, 0]
class = 0
_ <= 0.5
gini = 0.039
samples = 151
value = [148, 3]
class = 0
gini = 0.0
samples = 3
value = [3, 0]
class = 0
rurl <= 0.5
gini = 0.039
samples = 149
value = [146, 3]
class = 0
gini = 0.0
samples = 2
value = [2, 0]
class = 0
#cookiekey_MUID <= 0.5
gini = 0.04
samples = 147
value = [144, 3]
class = 0
gini = 0.0
samples = 2
value = [2, 0]
class = 0
location <= 0.5
gini = 0.041
samples = 145
value = [142, 3]
class = 0
gini = 0.0
samples = 2
value = [2, 0]
class = 0
#cookiekey_TDID <= 0.5
gini = 0.041
samples = 143
value = [140, 3]
class = 0
gini = 0.0
samples = 2
value = [2, 0]
class = 0
format <= 0.5
gini = 0.042
samples = 141
value = [138, 3]
class = 0
gini = 0.0
samples = 2
value = [2, 0]
class = 0
#customheader_purpose <= 0.5
gini = 0.042
samples = 139
value = [136, 3]
class = 0
gini = 0.0
samples = 2
value = [2, 0]
class = 0
null <= 0.5
gini = 0.043
samples = 137
value = [134, 3]
class = 0
gini = 0.0
samples = 2
value = [2, 0]
class = 0
#cookiekey___cfduid <= 0.5
gini = 0.043
samples = 135
value = [132, 3]
class = 0
gini = 0.0
samples = 2
value = [2, 0]
class = 0
callback <= 0.5
gini = 0.044
samples = 133
value = [130, 3]
class = 0
gini = 0.0
samples = 2
value = [2, 0]
class = 0
#cookiekey_mediavine_session_depth <= 0.5
gini = 0.045
samples = 131
value = [128, 3]
class = 0
gini = 0.0
samples = 2
value = [2, 0]
class = 0
#cookiekey_ab <= 0.5
gini = 0.045
samples = 129
value = [126, 3]
class = 0
gini = 0.0
samples = 2
value = [2, 0]
class = 0
vcode <= 0.5
gini = 0.046
samples = 128
value = [125, 3]
class = 0
gini = 0.0
samples = 1
value = [1, 0]
class = 0
#cookiekey_demdex <= 0.5
gini = 0.046
samples = 127
value = [124, 3]
class = 0
gini = 0.0
samples = 1
value = [1, 0]
class = 0
#cookiekey__kuid_ <= 0.5
gini = 0.046
samples = 126
value = [123, 3]
class = 0
gini = 0.0
samples = 1
value = [1, 0]
class = 0
oh <= 0.5
gini = 0.047
samples = 125
value = [122, 3]
class = 0
gini = 0.0
samples = 1
value = [1, 0]
class = 0
#cookiekey_dpr <= 0.5
gini = 0.047
samples = 124
value = [121, 3]
class = 0
gini = 0.0
samples = 1
value = [1, 0]
class = 0
type <= 0.5
gini = 0.048
samples = 123
value = [120, 3]
class = 0
gini = 0.0
samples = 1
value = [1, 0]
class = 0
#cookiekey__li_ss <= 0.5
gini = 0.048
samples = 122
value = [119, 3]
class = 0
gini = 0.0
samples = 1
value = [1, 0]
class = 0
redir <= 0.5
gini = 0.048
samples = 121
value = [118, 3]
class = 0
gini = 0.0
samples = 1
value = [1, 0]
class = 0
family <= 0.5
gini = 0.049
samples = 120
value = [117, 3]
class = 0
gini = 0.0
samples = 1
value = [1, 0]
class = 0
canon <= 0.5
gini = 0.049
samples = 119
value = [116, 3]
class = 0
gini = 0.0
samples = 1
value = [1, 0]
class = 0
#customheader_access-control-request-headers <= 0.5
gini = 0.05
samples = 118
value = [115, 3]
class = 0
gini = 0.0
samples = 1
value = [1, 0]
class = 0
#customheader_resource-freshness <= 0.5
gini = 0.05
samples = 117
value = [114, 3]
class = 0
gini = 0.0
samples = 1
value = [1, 0]
class = 0
#cookiekey__cc_dc <= 0.5
gini = 0.05
samples = 116
value = [113, 3]
class = 0
gini = 0.0
samples = 1
value = [1, 0]
class = 0
ssp <= 0.5
gini = 0.051
samples = 115
value = [112, 3]
class = 0
gini = 0.0
samples = 1
value = [1, 0]
class = 0
puid <= 0.5
gini = 0.051
samples = 114
value = [111, 3]
class = 0
gini = 0.0
samples = 1
value = [1, 0]
class = 0
ver <= 0.5
gini = 0.052
samples = 113
value = [110, 3]
class = 0
gini = 0.0
samples = 1
value = [1, 0]
class = 0
w <= 0.5
gini = 0.052
samples = 112
value = [109, 3]
class = 0
gini = 0.0
samples = 1
value = [1, 0]
class = 0
domain <= 0.5
gini = 0.053
samples = 111
value = [108, 3]
class = 0
gini = 0.0
samples = 1
value = [1, 0]
class = 0
33random <= 0.5
gini = 0.053
samples = 110
value = [107, 3]
class = 0
gini = 0.0
samples = 1
value = [1, 0]
class = 0
gini = 0.054
samples = 109
value = [106, 3]
class = 0
gini = 0.0
samples = 1
value = [1, 0]
class = 0
Figure 13: Zoomed-in version of Fig. 11(a), showing a Decision Tree (DT) trained on its own.
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